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In the year 1611, Barbara, first wife of the imperial mathemati-
cian and court astronomer Johannes Kepler, died of cholera in 
Prague. Kepler, widower and father of two, immediately began 
a methodical quest for a replacement. He considered 11 candi-
dates, eventually choosing Susanna Reuttinger, who, he wrote, 
“won me over with love, humble loyalty, economy of house-
hold, diligence, and the love she gave the stepchildren” 
(Connor, 2004, p. 252). Although we do not know how he 
inspected the 11 candidates, several search strategies are pos-
sible: Antedating modern online dating strategies, he could 
have chatted with each of them on alternate days over a period 
of months, recording whom he liked most over each series of 
11 days. Alternatively, he could have spent weeks at a time 
with each candidate, making summary assessments of each.
Although both search strategies could uncover the same 
information, the choices that follow from them would not nec-
essarily be the same. The first strategy might have led Kepler 
to choose the person who was better in more of the 11-day 
bouts than any other candidate. The second strategy, in con-
trast, might have led him to choose a partner whose long-term 
mate value turned out to be best. This could have been a per-
son who was not the best companion on many days of the year 
but who greatly surpassed any competitor on a few days. This 
divergence in the final decision highlights an important possi-
bility: Specific sequential search strategies employed in mak-
ing a choice could be coupled with specific decision strategies 
employed to render the final decision. This coupling was the 
focus of our study.
We examined this possible coupling by focusing on a para-
digm that has been termed decisions from experience (Her-
twig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) in the study of choice 
under risk. One task used to study such decisions is the sam-
pling task (Hertwig & Erev, 2009): People sample as long as 
they wish from two initially unknown payoff distributions 
before making a final exploitative draw. Sampling involves 
two elements. First, participants choose one of the distribu-
tions—one distribution could, for instance, offer $32 with a 
probability of 10%, or $0 otherwise; the other distribution 
could offer $3 for sure. Second, participants witness the out-
comes according to each distribution’s associated payoff 
schedules (e.g., $0, $0, $32 in the first distribution and $3, $3, 
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$3 in the second). Thus, in this paradigm, participants can 
experience as many outcomes as they wish without the associ-
ated monetary consequences. Once the evaluation is termi-
nated, participants make a final, consequential choice.
Experienced-based risky decisions can deviate systemati-
cally from decisions from descriptions (Hertwig et al., 
2004)—a phenomenon called the description-experience gap. 
People make description-based decisions when presented with 
options in which all outcomes and probabilities are stated 
explicitly—for instance, “$32 with a probability of 10% and 
$0 otherwise versus $3 with certainty.” In decisions from 
experience, people often behave as if rare events (e.g., win-
ning $32) have less impact than they deserve according to 
their objective probabilities. In decisions from description, 
however, people behave as if the rare events have more impact 
than they deserve, and they therefore make decisions consis-
tent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Is the Description-Experience Gap Related 
to How People Search?
Hertwig and Erev (2009) reviewed possible causes of the 
description-experience gap. These causes included sample 
size (people may take samples in quantities too small to yield 
rare events), recency (people may overweight recent, often 
common, events), estimation error (people may underestimate 
the frequency of rare events), and format-dependent cognitive 
algorithms (the different formats of statistical information in 
decisions from experience and decisions from description may 
trigger different cognitive algorithms).
There is, however, another possible cause that has previ-
ously been ignored. Could it be that the description-experience 
gap is related to people’s sampling strategies and the poten-
tially corresponding decision policies that people employ? 
Figure 1a depicts the two paradigmatic sequential-sampling 
strategies that we illustrated with Kepler’s mate search. Given 
two options, at least two strategies can be used to explore them 
sequentially. In piecewise sampling, a search oscillates 
between options, each time drawing the smallest possible sam-
ple. In comprehensive sampling, a search samples extensively 
from one option and then samples extensively from the other 
option. Taking these two sampling strategies as a starting 
point—acknowledging that many strategies will fall on the 
continuum between them—we hypothesized that the way peo-
ple sample is related to how they make their final decision.
Specifically, we suggest that individuals who sample piece-
wise will be more likely to make decisions consistent with a 
round-wise decision strategy: determining which option is bet-
ter in each round of sampling and ultimately choosing the one 
that wins the most rounds (Fig. 1b, left). In comparison, indi-
viduals who use a comprehensive sampling strategy will be 
more likely to make decisions consistent with a summary deci-
sion strategy: evaluating average yields and then choosing the 
option with the larger average yield (Fig. 1b, right). The rea-
son is that the different search strategies facilitate comparisons 
across different scales of information (i.e., rounds compared 
with summaries). As Figure 1b illustrates, these decision strat-
egies can lead to different choices even though they process 
the same information.1
Could such a coupling between search strategies and deci-
sion strategies help explain the emergence of the description-
experience gap? If frequent switching between options is 
associated with a round-wise decision strategy, then the answer 
is yes, because this strategy weighs each round equally, ignores 
the magnitude of wins and losses, and thus underweights rare 
outcomes. If this line of reasoning holds, we should observe 
two dependencies in decisions from experience. First, there 
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Fig. 1. Two theoretical sampling patterns (a) and associated decision 
strategies (b). Piecewise sampling strategies alternate back and forth between 
options, whereas comprehensive sampling strategies take one large sample 
from each option in turn. Following the sampling phase, participants make 
a decision about which option they prefer. Round-wise decision strategies 
compare outcomes over repeated rounds and lead strategists to choose 
options that win the most rounds. Summary decision strategies compare final 
mean values (here, the overall expected value) and lead strategists to choose 
options with the higher final value.
Search in Decisions From Experience 1789
and their decision strategies—with more switching between 
options corresponding to more decisions consistent with 
round-wise comparisons. Second, there should be a depen-
dency between decision strategies and the psychological 
impact of rare events—with more switching between options 
(and round-wise comparisons) corresponding to more under-
weighting of rare events. Finding evidence for these depen-
dencies would require a large set of data because the sampling 
strategies and decision strategies depicted in Figure 1 are ide-
alizations; in reality, there are many variants of them. To 
assemble a large data set, we took advantage of the fact that in 
recent years, several studies have investigated decisions from 
experience using very similar methodologies.
Method
We pooled decisions from experience and search data from the 
following four published studies: Hertwig et al. (2004); Exper-
iments 1 and 2 of Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, and Hertwig (2008); 
Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart (2009); and Hertwig and Ples-
kac (2010).2 All data from these studies stem from free-
sampling conditions, in which participants chose freely how long 
to sample and how to distribute their search over two options. 
Because we were not interested in underweighting as a result 
of small sample sizes (see Hertwig et al., 2004), we included 
only those decisions in which participants encountered all out-
comes for each option at least once in their sample. The final 
data set encompassed 1,223 decisions over 233 participants.
Across all studies, the experimental procedure was the 
same: Participants saw two buttons on a computer screen and 
were told that each button was associated with a payoff distri-
bution. Clicking on a button revealed an outcome from the 
respective payoff distribution. Participants’ search policies 
were recorded as they sampled—until they indicated their 
final decision.
Results
We first analyzed participants’ switching behavior by calcu-
lating the ratio between a person’s switches and the maxi-
mum number of allowable switches (i.e., n − 1, with n being 
the total number of draws). People’s propensity to switch 
ranged widely, from a minimum ratio of .02 to a maximum 
ratio of .95 (Fig. 2). In accordance with the notion that there 
may be two types of sampling strategies, the distribution was 
bimodal, with peaks near .1 and .5. This distribution was well 
split by the median of .16 (indicated by the dotted line in 
Fig. 2). We defined participants above the median as frequent 
switchers and participants below the median as infrequent 
switchers.
Is there a dependency between  
sampling and deciding?
For each participant, we simulated the final decision predicted 
by both the round-wise and the summary decision strategies. 
We focused on only those decisions for which the round-wise 
strategy and the summary strategy predicted different final 
choices—leaving us with 59 frequent switchers and 55 infre-
quent switchers. People who switched between options more 
often had a significantly larger proportion of their decisions 
predicted by the round-wise strategy (Fig. 3). In contrast, 
infrequent switchers’ decisions were better predicted by the 
summary strategy, t(112) = −3.22, p < .01. There was thus a 





















Fig. 2. Histogram of people’s propensity to switch between two options. The observed number of switches 
is expressed as the ratio of the observed switches over the maximum number of allowable switches. For 
each of the 233 participants, we calculated the mean switching frequency across problems. The dotted line 
represents the median value of .16.
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Could sampling effort (i.e., sample size) also predict the use 
of a round-wise strategy? The results of Rakow, Demes, and 
Newell (2008) suggested a potential correlation between sam-
ple size and switching frequency. Our results confirmed such a 
relationship. Using only problems in which all outcomes were 
seen, we found that switching frequency was negatively corre-
lated with the total number of samples, r = −.44, t(231) = −7.4, 
p < .001. However, using a median split to divide the sample 
sizes, we found that sample size did not have a significant 
effect on the frequency of usage of the round-wise strategy (p = 
.15). Thus, frequency of switching appears to be a better pre-
dictor of round-wise decision policies than does sample size.3
Is there a dependency between sampling, 
deciding, and the impact of rare events?
To investigate the relationship between decision strategy and 
the impact of rare events, we calculated how often decisions 
based on the round-wise strategy or the summary strategy 
would underweight rare events across the 1,223 decisions. (We 
computed both strategies for each participant’s sampling data.) 
For instance, in the decision problem that offered $32 with a 
chance of 10% ($0 otherwise) or $3 for sure, choosing the $3 
for sure would be consistent with underweighting the rare $32 
event. Figure 4 shows that if participants were using the round-
wise strategy, they would have been significantly more likely 
to underweight the rare event than if they were using the sum-
mary strategy, paired t(231) = −7.39, p < .001. As predicted, the 
strategies led to different amounts of underweighting, even 
when participants saw exactly the same information.
Next, we found that people who switch options frequently, 
and are thus likely to be using a round-wise strategy (Fig. 3), 
will generally also be more likely than others to underweight 
rare events. As already noted, frequent switchers tend to take 
smaller samples, so they may often underweight rare events 
simply because they do not experience them. However, even 
when rare events are experienced, a round-wise strategy may 
still give rise to underweighting. To evaluate this possibility, 
we simulated decisions based on the round-wise strategy for 
frequent switchers and decisions based on the summary strat-
egy for infrequent switchers. Then, we determined how often 
the predicted decisions were consistent with underweighting 
rare events. Figure 5a shows that the predicted average pro-
portion of choices consistent with underweighting for frequent 
switchers using the round-wise strategy would be .65, and the 
corresponding proportion for infrequent switchers using the 
summary strategy would be .47, t(223.2) = 4.8, p < .001.
Figure 5b compares these predicted choices with the 
choices actually made. The actual choices of frequent switch-






























Fig. 3. Differences in the proportion of decisions that were consistent 
with the round-wise strategy and the summary strategy as a function of the 
frequency of switching between two options. A positive difference means 
that more choices were consistent with the round-wise decision strategy 
than with the summary decision strategy; a negative difference indicates a 
preponderance of choices consistent with the summary strategy. Error bars 



































Fig. 4. Underweighting of rare events as a function of decision strategy. On 
the basis of each participant’s sampled outcomes, we simulated decisions 
assuming a round-wise strategy or a summary strategy. Results were averaged 
first within participants and then across participants; all 233 participants and 
their decisions were included in the analysis of each strategy. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean.
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events than were the actual choices of infrequent switchers 
(.60 vs. .52), t(228.5) = −1.99, p < .05. Moreover, the observed 
values were not significantly different from their correspond-
ing predicted values (p > .05). Finally, Figure 5b also presents 
the appropriately weighted mean proportion of decisions from 
description (taken from all four studies) consistent with under-
weighting for the same problems. Relative to the decisions of 
both frequent and infrequent switchers, people’s decisions 
from description were even less consistent with underweight-
ing rare events (M = .42), t(113) = 4.36, p < .001.
Conclusions
In decisions from experience, people are the masters of their 
information search. That is, people control how they distribute 
their attention over options and for how long they do so. Previ-
ous research has focused on the limited size of samples that 
people have taken before making decisions from experience 
(e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & 
Pleskac, 2010). In this study, we showed that how people search 
also matters. People’s sampling patterns—predominantly 
piecewise or comprehensive—were indicative of their deci-
sions. Moreover, sampling patterns foreshadowed the impact 
of rare events—with piecewise sampling often preceding the 
underweighting of rare events.
Why is the way people search indicative of the decisions 
they make? Is it because people initially choose a decision 
strategy that, in turn, fosters a particular search strategy? Or is 
it that people at first choose a search strategy, which then leads 
them to evaluate information in a certain way? Currently, we 
cannot answer these questions conclusively. It is important, 
however, to note that piecewise and comprehensive explora-
tion strategies resonate with short-term and long-term exploita-
tion strategies. Key normative and descriptive theories of 
choice, such as expected value and expected utility, are long 
term in nature because they recommend choosing the option 
that is best in the long run (and possibly involves a rare but 
significant event). Short-term strategies, in contrast, favor 
options that provide the best outcomes most of the time and are 
thus more likely to be rewarding in the present. Such strategies 
are prevalent both theoretically and practically. For example, 
risk sensitivity and state-dependent foraging explain why a bird 
that needs food regularly should concern itself with short-term 
outcomes and not fixate on the long-term average (e.g., Caraco, 
1980; Houston & McNamara, 1999; Stephens, 1981). Similar 
trade-offs between short-term and long-term outcomes are 
extremely common, and are evident, for example, in the St. 
Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738/1954) and the Iowa gam-
bling task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). 



















































































Fig. 5. Predicted and observed proportions of decisions consistent with underweighting rare events among infrequent switchers and frequent 
switchers. The predicted proportions if all infrequent switchers were employing the summary strategy and all frequent switchers were employing a 
round-wise strategy are shown in (a). The observed proportions, along with the results observed in the corresponding decisions-from-description 
conditions, are shown in (b). For decisions from description, we weighted each problem by the number of participants responding in the original 
studies and by the number of times a problem was represented in the sampling task. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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strategies may to some extent provide a blueprint for explor-
atory search strategies and the decisions that follow them.
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Notes
1. When a round encompassed more than one outcome per option, we 
computed the mean reward (the sum of outcomes divided by the num-
ber of draws; Sutton & Barto, 1998) per round, per option, to deter-
mine the better option for each round. The option that won more rounds 
was the winner. Winners could also be determined using overlapping 
rounds (e.g., A-B, B-A, A-B) or a maximax heuristic (comparing the 
best outcomes from each option per round). These methods generate 
qualitatively similar results and do not affect our conclusions. The 
summary strategy compared the overall mean reward for each option.
2. Hertwig et al. (2004), Hau et al. (2008), and Ungemach et al. 
(2008) used the same 6 decision problems. Hertwig and Pleskac 
(2010) used 12 problems.
3. We also conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting the 
proportion of decisions consistent with a round-wise strategy (as 
in Fig. 1) using both total sample size and switching frequency as 
predictors. Total sample size was not a significant predictor, β = 
0.02, t(111) = 0.14, p = .89, but switching frequency was, β = 0.41, 
t(111) = 2.83, p < .01.
References
Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S.W. (1994). 
Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to the 
human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50, 7–15.
Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement 
of risk (L. Sommer, Trans.). Econometrica, 22, 23–36. (Original 
work published 1738)
Caraco, T. (1980). On foraging time allocation in a stochastic envi-
ronment. Ecology, 61, 119–128.
Connor, J.A. (2004). Kepler’s witch: An astronomer’s discovery of 
cosmic order amid religious war, political intrigue, and the her-
esy trial of his mother. San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins.
Fox, C.R., & Hadar, L. (2006). “Decisions from experience” = 
sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Bar-
ron, Weber, & Erev (2004). Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 
159–161.
Hau, R., Pleskac, T.J., Kiefer, J., & Hertwig, R. (2008). The 
description–experience gap in risky choice: The role of sample size 
and experienced probabilities. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 21, 493–518.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E.U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions 
from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice. Psy-
chological Science, 15, 534–539.
Hertwig, R., & Erev, I. (2009). The description–experience gap in 
risky choice. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 517–523.
Hertwig, R., & Pleskac, T.J. (2010). Decisions from experience: Why 
small samples? Cognition, 115, 225–237.
Houston, A.I., & McNamara, J.M. (1999). Models of adaptive behav-
ior: An approach based on state. Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291.
Rakow, T., Demes, K.A., & Newell, B.R. (2008). Biased sam-
ples not mode of presentation: Re-examining the apparent 
underweighting of rare events in experience-based choice. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 106, 
168–179.
Stephens, D.W. (1981). The logic of risk-sensitive foraging prefer-
ences. Animal Behavior, 129, 628–629.
Sutton, R.S., & Barto, A.G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An 
introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ungemach, C., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (2009). Are probabilities 
overweighted or underweighted when rare outcomes are experi-
enced (rarely)? Psychological Science, 20, 473–479.
